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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________________ 
 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 There are two interrelated issues in this appeal.  
First, whether the venue provision of the Financial Institution 
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"), 12 
  
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) (Supp. II 1990),1 governs only actions 
brought against the failed depository institution or whether it 
also applies to actions against the institution's receiver.  
Second, whether the claims procedures established in FIRREA, 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(d), cover actions against the receiver as well as 
actions against the failed institution. 
 This case arises out of the failure of a state bank, 
Citytrust of Connecticut.  Hudson United Bank brought suit in the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
against Chase Manhattan Bank of Connecticut, the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation, and Chase's wholly owned subsidiary, 
Consolidated Asset Recovery Corporation, seeking a declaratory 
judgment of its rights to certain funds as a result of its 
participation interest in loans made by the failed bank.  The 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, as receiver for the failed 
bank, moved to transfer the action to the District of Connecticut 
under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).  The district court granted the 
motion to transfer, holding that the claims procedures applied to 
actions against the receiver and that a change of venue was 
required under FIRREA.  The court then certified the issue for 
interlocutory appeal.  Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, NA, 832 F. Supp. 881 (D.N.J.  
                     
1
.  FIRREA, Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989) (appears in 
various sections of the United States Code).  The current version 
of § 1821(d) appears in 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d) (Supp. V 1993), but 
there have been no material changes in the parts relevant to this 
dispute.  Unless otherwise noted, citations to 12 U.S.C. § 1821 
will be to the 1990 version. 
  
1993).  We will affirm. 
 
 I. 
 Plaintiff/appellant Hudson United Bank ("Hudson") is a 
New Jersey corporation.2  Defendant/appellee Chase Manhattan Bank 
of Connecticut, NA ("Chase"), is a national association of the 
state of Connecticut, with offices in Connecticut.  Citytrust of 
Connecticut ("Citytrust"), the failed bank now in receivership, 
was a state bank licensed in Connecticut.  Kleinberg Electric is 
a New York corporation that was a customer of Citytrust and is 
now in bankruptcy, allegedly as a result of actions of the 
defendants.  Paul and Carol Kleinberg, the guarantors on the 
loan, were both New Jersey residents at the time the loan was 
executed. 
 In 1987, Citytrust extended to Kleinberg Electric a $1 
million term loan and a $1.25 million line of credit.  Hudson 
bought a 63% interest in Kleinberg Electric's term loan as part 
of a Loan Participation Agreement.  In 1991, Citytrust failed and 
was placed under the control of the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation as receiver.  Following standard procedure, the FDIC 
sought a buyer for Citytrust and found Chase, which entered into 
a Purchase and Assumption Agreement with the FDIC allowing Chase 
to evaluate Citytrust's assets and "put" any unwanted assets back 
                     
2
.  Hudson and its predecessor-in-interest, HUB National Bank, 
formerly known as Meadowlands National Bank, are collectively 
called "Hudson."  All its employees with knowledge of this matter 
reside in New Jersey.  
  
to the receiver.  Chase's subsidiary, Consolidated Asset Recovery 
Corporation ("CARC"), was to manage (with FDIC supervision) any 
Citytrust assets that were retained or reacquired by the FDIC.   
  Sometime after Citytrust's bankruptcy in August 1991 
and the start of this new arrangement, Hudson ceased receiving 
payments for its participation interest in the Kleinberg loan.  
In addition, the Kleinberg line of credit was terminated, 
apparently upon the closing of the FDIC's Purchase and Assumption 
Agreement with Chase.  Hudson, 832 F. Supp. at 883.  Two months 
later, Chase "put" the Kleinberg loans back to the receiver, to 
be managed by CARC.   
  Hudson claimed it had not been notified of Citytrust's 
bankruptcy and learned of it only in November 1991 when it 
inquired about the discontinued loan payments.  In January 1992 
CARC accelerated the loans, allegedly causing Kleinberg to file 
for bankruptcy.  Even after filing for bankruptcy, Kleinberg 
continued to make payments to CARC on the Citytrust loans, but 
CARC allegedly failed to remit to Hudson its full share of those 
payments.  By early 1992 it appeared that Hudson was losing money 
on the Kleinberg loan.  In March 1992, however, Chase deposited 
$476,176.80 into an account of Hudson's at Chase, and Hudson 
withdrew that money as payment in full of the loan participation.  
Chase then decided it had deposited the money by mistake and 
asked for it back.  Hudson responded by seeking a declaratory 
judgment of its rights to the funds, punitive damages, and 
litigation expenses.  Hudson alleged breach of the Loan 
Participation Agreement, breach of the duty of good faith, breach 
  
of fiduciary duty, and fraudulent concealment.  Chase 
counterclaimed for the return of the money. 
 After filing its action, Hudson asked the FDIC receiver 
whether administrative review of its claims was a necessary 
prerequisite to bringing suit.  The FDIC forwarded a claim notice 
to Hudson, which Hudson filed.  The FDIC then disallowed the 
claim and moved to transfer the case to the District of 
Connecticut under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) (1988)3 and 12 U.S.C. § 
1821(d)(6)(A).  The FDIC contended that New Jersey was the wrong 
venue because  
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) specifies that a claimant can only 
bring suit in the district where the failed depository 
institution had its principal place of business or in the 
District of Columbia.  Because Citytrust's principal place of 
business was in Connecticut, the FDIC asserted that the case 
should be transferred there.  Hudson opposed transfer, contending 
§ 1821(d)(6)(A) only refers to claims against the failed 
depository institution, not to claims based on actions taken by 
the FDIC after the bank failed, which are actually against the 
receiver, not the institution.  The district court granted the 
                     
3
.  Section 1406(a) provides: 
 
 The district court of a district in which is 
filed a case laying venue in the wrong 
division or district shall dismiss, or if it 
be in the interest of justice, transfer such 
case to any district or division in which it 
could have been brought. 
 
  
FDIC's motion to transfer and then certified the following 
question for interlocutory appeal:4 
 Does the venue provision in [FIRREA],  
 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6) apply to an action 
which is brought against the receiver for 
wrongs allegedly committed by the receiver 
rather than the failed institution? 
 
 
 II.  
 We have plenary review over the district court's  
conclusions of law.  Tudor Dev. Group, Inc. v. United States 
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 968 F.2d 357, 359 (3d Cir. 1992); Gregoire 
v. Centennial Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1370 (3d Cir.), cert. 
denied, 498 U.S. 899 (1990).  We are not limited to the certified 
question, but may rule on other issues relevant to the appeal.  
                     
4
.  We must decide whether the district court had jurisdiction to 
certify the question after it had ordered the transfer.  The 
general rule is that the transferor court loses jurisdiction when 
the files in a case are physically transferred to the transferee 
court.  See, e.g., Wilson-Cook Medical, Inc. v. Wilson, 942 F.2d 
247, 250 (4th Cir. 1991); Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Country 
Chrysler, Inc., 928 F.2d 1509, 1516-17 (10th Cir. 1991); Robbins 
v. Pocket Beverage Co., 779 F.2d 351, 355 (7th Cir. 1985).   
 
 In this case, the district court granted the motion to 
transfer on September 17, 1993.  On September 24, 1993, Hudson 
served notice of a motion to certify the issue to this Court, and 
on October 12, 1993, the district court granted a stay of the 
transfer until it decided the motion to certify.  Nothing in the 
record indicates the district court had completed (or even begun) 
the process of physically transferring the files.  We assume the 
district court delayed physical transfer of the files to allow 
the parties time to file a motion for certification.  Cf. 
Chrysler Credit, 928 F.2d at 1517 & n.7 (observing this type of 
delay is the "preferred approach").  The district court had 
jurisdiction to certify the question we consider here.  
  
Johnson v. Alldredge, 488 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. 
denied, 419 U.S. 882 (1974).   
 The district court granted the motion to transfer venue 
under FIRREA, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A).  The provision on venue 
is entitled "Provision for agency review or judicial 
determination of claims."  12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6).  Subparagraph 
(A) provides:     
 In general 
 
 Before the end of the 60-day period beginning 
on the earlier of-- 
  (i) the end of the period described 
in paragraph (5)(A)(i) with respect 
to any claim against a depository 
institution for which the 
Corporation is receiver; or 
  (ii) the date of any notice of 
disallowance of such claim pursuant 
to paragraph (5)(A)(i),5 
 
 the claimant may request administrative 
review of the claim . . . or file suit on 
such claim (or continue an action commenced 
before the appointment of the receiver) in 
the district or territorial court of the 
United States for the district within which 
                     
5
.  Section 1821(d)(5)(A)(i) provides: 
 
 (5) Procedures for determination of claims 
 
     (A) Determination period 
 
  (i) In general 
  Before the end of the 180-day period 
beginning on the date any claim against a 
depository institution is filed with the 
Corporation as receiver, the Corporation 
shall determine whether to allow or disallow 
the claim and shall notify the claimant of 
any determination with respect to such claim. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i). 
  
the depository institution's principal place 
of business is located or the United States 
District Court for the District of Columbia 
(and such court shall have jurisdiction to 
hear such claim).  
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) (footnote supplied).   
 As we have noted, Hudson contends this subparagraph, 
with its venue provision, applies only to claims against a 
depository institution; that is, it applies only to claims 
against Citytrust and not to claims against the FDIC.  If true, 
the FDIC as receiver cannot request a change of venue under 
FIRREA.  In addition, Hudson maintains the entire subsection (d) 
is inapplicable to breach of contract actions like the present 
dispute.  Finally, Hudson asserts that under certain 
circumstances application of the provisions in subsection (d) 
would create an unconstitutional result. 
 A. 
 Hudson maintains that claims against the receiver 
cannot be considered under § 1821(d)(6)(A),6 but must be analyzed 
                     
6
.  The applicability of the venue provision is the principal 
issue in this case, so it is helpful to locate the provision 
within the statute and to describe the scope of the section in 
which it occurs.  Section 1821, entitled "Insurance Funds," 
covers all aspects of the FDIC's administration of insurance 
funds.  The two subsections at issue are: subsection (d), "Powers 
and duties of Corporation as conservator or receiver" and 
subsection (e), "Provisions relating to contracts entered into 
before appointment of conservator or receiver."  12 U.S.C. § 
1821(d), (e).  
 
     Subsection (d) relates to the powers and duties of the 
Corporation ("The Corporation" refers in this context to the 
FDIC), and is divided into 19 paragraphs.  Those at issue are: ¶ 
(3), "Authority of the receiver to determine claims" (giving the 
notice requirements for claimants, including timing); ¶ (5), 
"Procedures for determination of claims" (setting out the period 
  
under § 1821(d)(5)(C) ("Disallowance of claims filed after end of 
filing period")7 or under § 1821(d)(6)(B) ("Statute of 
(..continued) 
during which claims will be decided); ¶ (6), "Provision for 
agency review or judicial determination of claims" (establishing 
review procedures, including the venue provision); and ¶ (13) 
"Additional rights and duties" (including a jurisdictional 
limitation on judicial review).  12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3), (5), 
(6), (13).  Subsection (e) deals with contracts made before 
appointment of the receiver.  Hudson discusses one of the 13 
paragraphs in § 1821(e), ¶ (2), "Timing of repudiation."  
Subsection (e), unlike (d), sets out no specific review 
procedures for claimants to follow.  12 U.S.C. § 1821(e). 
7
.  Section 1821(d)(5)(C) provides: 
 
 (5) Procedures for determination of claims 
 
  . . . . 
 
  (C) Disallowance of claims filed after end of 
filing period 
 
       (i) In general 
    Except as provided in clause (ii), 
claims filed after the date specified in 
the notice published under paragraph 
(3)(B)(i) shall be disallowed and such 
disallowance shall be final. 
 
       (ii) Certain exceptions 
    Clause (i) shall not apply with 
respect to any claim filed by any 
claimant after the date specified in the 
notice published under paragraph 
(3)(B)(i) and such claim may be 
considered by the receiver if-- 
     (I) the claimant did not 
receive notice of the appointment 
of the receiver in time to file 
such claim before such date; and 
     (II) such claim is filed in 
time to permit payment of such 
claim. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C). 
  
Limitations").8  Hudson points out that § 1821(d)(13)(D)9 
                     
8
.  Section 1821(d)(6)(B) provides: 
 
 (6) Provision for agency review or judicial 
determination of claims 
 
  . . . . 
 
  (B) Statute of limitations 
     If any claimant fails to-- 
   (i) request administrative 
review of any claim in accordance 
with subparagraph (A) or (B) of 
paragraph (7); or 
   (ii) file suit on such claim 
(or continue an action commenced 
before the appointment of the 
receiver), 
 
 before the end of the 60-day period described 
in subparagraph (A), the claim shall be 
deemed to be disallowed (other than any 
portion of such claim which was allowed by 
the receiver) as of the end of such period, 
such disallowance shall be final, and the 
claimant shall have no further rights or 
remedies with respect to such claim. 
 
Id. § 1821(d)(6)(B).   
9
.  Section 1821(d)(13)(D) provides: 
 
 (13) Additional rights and duties 
 
  . . . . 
 
  (D) Limitation on judicial review 
   Except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection, no court shall have jurisdiction 
over-- 
    (i) any claim or action for payment 
from, or any action seeking a 
determination of rights with respect to, 
the assets of any depository institution 
for which the Corporation has been 
appointed receiver, including assets 
  
specifically provides for claims against the receiver while § 
1821(d)(6)(A), which contains the venue provision, does not.  
From this Hudson concludes that the venue provision (§ 
1821(d)(6)(A)) if read literally applies only to claims against 
the depository institution, not to claims against the receiver.  
The FDIC disagrees, contending Congress intended § 1821(d)(6)(A) 
to include claims against the receiver.  The district court 
agreed with the FDIC. 
 The district court acknowledged that Hudson's argument 
had some force if § 1821(d)(6)(A) were read without reference to 
the related parts of FIRREA that establish claims procedures.  
But the district court rejected Hudson's interpretation because 
it found that applying the claims procedures' venue provision to 
all claims (including claims against the receiver) was more 
consistent with the statutory structure and the purposes of 
FIRREA.  Following the approach we employed in Rosa v. Resolution 
Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 
(1991),10 the district court looked to the other sections of 
(..continued) 
which the Corporation may acquire from 
itself as such receiver; or 
    (ii) any claim relating to any act 
or omission of such institution or the 
Corporation as receiver. 
 
Id. § 1821(d)(13)(D). 
10
.  Hudson reminds us that in Rosa we construed § 1821(d)(13)(D) 
of FIRREA literally, holding that it did not apply to entities 
unless they were explicitly included.  Rosa, 938 F.2d at 393-94.  
In Rosa, we held 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) parts (i) and (ii) 
applied only to the claims specified.  See supra note 9 for the 
text of this subparagraph.  Thus, with respect to this two-part 
subsection, we held (i) applied only to claims against failed 
  
FIRREA that detail the claims process for guidance in 
understanding the scope of the venue provision.11   
(..continued) 
institutions while (ii) applied to claims against failed 
institutions specified in (i) as well as to claims against the 
receiver of such institutions.  Rosa, 938 F.2d at 393-94. 
 
 Hudson argues that application of Rosa's literal 
approach to § 1821(d)(6)(A) is proper and leads to the conclusion 
that § 1821(d)(6)(A) excludes claims against receivers since they 
are not mentioned.  But § 1821(d)(13)(D), which we interpreted in 
Rosa, differs from the one under consideration in that it 
comprises two parts, one of which addresses claims relating to 
the institution and the other which pertains to claims relating 
to either the depository institution or the receiver.   
 
 This structure made us confident in Rosa that the 
failure to mention claims against the receiver in the first part 
was not just careless drafting.  Where Congress took care in part 
(ii) to include claims relating to the receiver as well as the 
depository institution, we could assume that Congress intended in 
part (i) to include only claims against the institution and to 
exclude those against the receiver.  Section 1821(d)(6)(A), 
however, contains no analogous divisions, and thus the import of 
the language is not as clear as it was for us in Rosa.  Hudson's 
argument that we should read § 1821(d)(6)(A) literally, as we did 
§ 1821(d)(13)(D), fails because of the difference in structure of 
the two subparagraphs. 
11
.  The district court properly followed the "cardinal rule that 
a statute is to be read as a whole, . . . since the meaning of 
statutory language, plain or not, depends on context."  King v. 
St. Vincent's Hosp., 112 S. Ct. 570, 574 (1991) (citation 
omitted).  As the Supreme Court has stated: "Statutory 
construction . . . is a holistic endeavor.  A provision that may 
seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder 
of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible 
meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with 
the rest of the law . . . ."  United Sav. Ass'n v. Timbers of 
Inwood Forest, 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (citations omitted); see 
also Smith v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2050, 2056-57 (1993) 
(construing scope of statutory language by reading various 
provisions together); Trathen v. United States, 198 F.2d 757, 760 
(3d Cir. 1952) (observing "[t]he meaning of any given word in a 
statute is properly determined by reading the language in 
question together with other sections of the act").   
  
 The district court first considered § 1821(d)(5)(A),12 
which outlines the claims procedures of FIRREA.  See Praxis 
Properties, Inc. v. Colonial Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 947 F.2d 49, 62-
63 (3d Cir. 1991) (reviewing FIRREA's administrative claims 
procedures).  Noting that the venue provision (§ 1821(d)(6)(A)) 
defines the claims to which it applies by express reference to § 
1821(d)(5)(A), the district court concluded that § 1821(d)(5)(A) 
and § 1821(d)(6)(A) applied to the same claims.  Both 
subparagraphs apply by their terms to "any claim against a 
depository institution" for which the FDIC is the receiver. 
 Having linked § 1821(d)(6)(A) to § 1821(d)(5)(A), the 
district court then considered whether claims against the 
receiver were covered under § 1821(d)(5), because if so, § 
1821(d)(6)(A) would have to cover them as well.  The district 
court first observed that we have routinely assumed that § 
1821(d)(5) applies to claims against the receiver.  See Rosa, 938 
F.2d at 395-96; Althouse v. Resolution Trust Corp., 969 F.2d 
1544, 1545-46 (3d Cir. 1992); Praxis Properties, 947 F.2d at 62-
64.  The district court then looked to § 1821(d)(13)(D) to 
explain why claims against the receiver had to be within the 
scope of § 1821(d)(5) and therefore within the scope of § 
1821(d)(6)(A).   
                     
12
.  The relevant part of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A) appears supra 
note 5. 
  
 Section 1821(d)(13)(D)13 bars judicial review except as 
otherwise provided in § 1821(d).  The jurisdictional bar of § 
1821(d)(13)(D) extends explicitly to claims against the receiver 
as well as to those against the depository institution.  Thus, 
unless § 1821(d)(5) allows administrative review of claims 
against the receiver, there would be no mechanism to review those 
claims--they would be barred from judicial review by § 
1821(d)(13)(D) and there would be no provision for review 
elsewhere.  The district court reasoned that if the paragraphs on 
administrative and judicial review of claims (§ 1821(d)(6)(A) and 
§ 1821(d)(5)(A)) did not apply to claims against the receiver, 
then § 1821(d)(13)(D) would compel a complete bar of review of 
claims against the receiver because no grant of jurisdiction 
exists elsewhere in § 1821(d).  As the district court reasoned: 
"Logic dictates that the claims barred by paragraph (13)(D) must 
coincide with those that may be filed under the administrative 
procedures of paragraph (5).  Otherwise, paragraphs (5) and 
(13)(D) would bar relief in the district court without providing 
relief elsewhere, and FIRREA would become a source of immunity 
for the Receiver."  Hudson United Bank v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 
NA, 832 F. Supp. 881, 886 (D.N.J. 1993).  The district court 
found that Congress did not intend FIRREA's claims process to 
immunize the receiver, but rather wanted to require exhaustion of 
                     
13
.  For the text of § 1821(d)(13)(D), see supra note 9. 
  
the receivership claims process before going to court.14  Id. at 
885-86. 
 On appeal, Hudson tries to answer this argument by 
finding implicit jurisdiction for claims against the receiver in 
§ 1821(d)(5)(C) and (d)(6)(B) which refer to "any claims."15  But 
neither section addresses claims against the receiver explicitly, 
and Hudson's attempt to find a grant of jurisdiction in them is 
strained.16  We find the district court's reading of § 1821(d) 
                     
14
.  As this is a matter of statutory construction, consideration 
of legislative history would be appropriate.  But neither party 
has cited material relevant to this venue dispute, and our own 
research has failed to uncover any. 
15
.  For the text of these paragraphs, see supra notes 7 and 8, 
respectively. 
16
.  Hudson also claims Congress intended to exclude claims 
against the receiver from the ambit of § 1821(d)(6)(A) by 
establishing two different procedures for processing claims, one 
for claims against the failed institutions (treated in § 
1821(d)(6)(A) and (d)(5)(A)) and another for claims against the 
receiver (treated in § 1821(d)(6)(B) and (d)(5)(C)), but without 
making that distinction explicit in the statute. 
 
 A look at the titles of the various parts of the 
statute supports the district court's view that Congress intended 
to establish a single set of procedures in § 1821(d).  See, e.g., 
INS v. National Ctr. for Immigrants' Rights, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 
551, 556 (1991) (noting title of statute or section can aid 
interpretation of statute's meaning); House v. Commissioner, 453 
F.2d 982, 987 (5th Cir. 1972) (observing the propriety of using 
section headings to determine a statute's meaning).  The general 
title of § 1821(d)(6) is "Provision for agency review or judicial 
determination of claims," and the title of § 1821(d)(6)(A), which 
contains the venue provision, is "In general."  This leads to the 
natural inference that procedures contained in the "In general" 
part apply to all cases of agency review or judicial 
determination of claims absent explicit exceptions.  12 U.S.C. § 
1821(d)(6)(A). 
 
 No such inference suggests a separate set of procedures 
in either § 1821(d)(6)(B) entitled "Statute of limitations" or § 
  
more convincing and consistent with congressional purpose as well 
as with our opinion in Rosa.    
 It is true that FIRREA is awkwardly written and 
difficult to interpret.17  But as the district court noted, the 
purpose of § 1821(d)(5)(A) and (d)(13)(D) was to force plaintiffs 
with claims against failed depository institutions to file their 
claims under FIRREA's administrative claims procedures before 
filing them in federal court.  H.R. Rep. No. 54(I), 101st Cong., 
1st Sess. 291, 418-19 (1989), reprinted in 1989 U.S.C.C.A.N. 86, 
214-15.  The purpose was not to immunize certain claims from 
review.  The district court also found application of the venue 
provision to claims against the receiver consistent with the 
claims process's purpose of promoting efficiency.  Treating 
claims against the receiver differently from claims against the 
institution would foster inefficiency by forcing the FDIC to 
"defend actions at various locations throughout the country, with 
the attendant disruption of the Bank's records and personnel, 
[and] the defendant's task would become further complicated."  
Hudson, 832 F. Supp. at 887 (citation omitted). 
(..continued) 
1821(d)(5)(C) "Disallowance of claims filed after end of filing 
period."  Further, there is no mention there of separate 
procedures for claims against the receiver.  We do not believe 
Congress intended to establish separate procedures in such an 
indirect and disjointed manner.  12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(B), 
(d)(5)(C). 
17
.  As one court lamented when faced with the task of 
interpreting § 1821(d): "FIRREA's text comprises an almost 
impenetrable thicket . . . .  [C]onfusion over its proper 
interpretation is not only unsurprising--it is inevitable."  
Marquis v. FDIC, 965 F.2d 1148, 1151 (1st Cir. 1992). 
  
 Accordingly, we hold that the venue provision in 12 
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A) applies to claims against the receiver.  
This holding answers the question we expressly left open in 
National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. City Savings, F.S.B., 28 
F.3d 376, 387 n.12 (3d Cir. 1994), as to the reach of § 
1821(d)(13)(D).  By deciding that the administrative claims 
procedures and the jurisdictional bar have concurrent scope, we 
avoid the possibility raised in National Union that § 
1821(d)(13)(D) could become "an independent and outright bar of 
jurisdiction" rather than a mere exhaustion requirement if § 
1821(d)(13)(D) were to have broader reach than the administrative 
claims procedures.  National Union, 28 F.3d at 387 n.12.  
  B. 
 Hudson's second statutory construction argument is that 
because this action involves the receiver's repudiation of a 
contract, it falls within § 1821(e) rather than § 1821(d).  We 
will consider this issue even though Hudson did not present it to 
the district court.  Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 
713 F.2d 958, 962 n.7 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1024 
(1984) (on interlocutory appeal, court can consider all grounds 
which might require reversal). 
 In arguing this point in its brief, Hudson relied 
almost entirely on Heno v. FDIC, 996 F.2d 429 (1st Cir. 1993) 
("Heno I"), withdrawn and superseded by 20 F.3d 1204 (1994) 
("Heno II").  By the time of oral argument, the Court of Appeals 
for the First Circuit had withdrawn Heno I and replaced it with 
  
Heno II.  At oral argument, counsel for Hudson announced that it 
still wished to rely on the reasoning of Heno I.   
 Heno had an executory contract with a bank that failed.  
Although it had notice of the FDIC's appointment as receiver 
before the expiration of the time for filing claims under § 
1821(d), it had no claim until after the bar date because the 
FDIC had not yet repudiated the contract and so it remained 
executory.  Therefore, Heno had no claim to file and no claim 
subject to administrative review.  Absent prior administrative 
review, the court lacked jurisdiction to hear Heno's claim.  12 
U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).  Heno had sent the FDIC two post-bar 
date letters requesting that the FDIC inform Heno of its position 
on the contract.  Under § 1821(d), however, the letters could not 
provide the court with jurisdiction because Heno had not filed a 
claim before the bar date.  In Heno I, the court of appeals 
reasoned Congress did not intend the administrative review 
procedures established under § 1821(d) to apply to preclude 
judicial review of post-receivership claims arising after the 90-
day filing period.  12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B).  Instead, the 
"reasonable period" time bar of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)18 would 
                     
18
.  Section 1821(e)(2) provides: 
 
 (e) Provisions relating to contracts entered 
into before appointment of conservator or 
receiver 
 
  . . . . 
 
  (2) Timing of repudiation 
   The conservator or receiver . . . shall 
determine whether or not to exercise the 
  
govern Heno's claim.  Heno II, 20 F.3d at 1208 (discussing Heno 
I).   
 The court of appeals withdrew Heno I after realizing 
that Heno's claim was in fact not barred under § 1821(d) once the 
FDIC's internal agency manual procedures for processing such 
post-bar date claims were properly applied.  The FDIC, in its 
petition for rehearing and then at reargument, represented that 
if it had considered Heno's claims as contract repudiation 
claims, Heno's letters would have been sufficient under its 
internal procedures to avoid the time bar.  Id.  This implied 
that the FDIC would allow administrative review and thereby 
remove the bar to judicial review.  Under those circumstances, 
the court did not find it necessary to treat Heno's contract 
claim against the receiver under § 1821(e) and went on to 
consider the parties' arguments under § 1821(d).  Id.  The 
internal agency manual procedures persuaded the court of appeals 
that resort to the application of § 1821(e) in breach of contract 
actions against the receiver was not routinely necessary to avoid 
an irrational result.  See id. at 1210-14 (setting forth the 
internal manual procedures in an appendix to the opinion). 
 In the present case, § 1821(d) will not apply to bar 
judicial review because of untimely filing for administrative 
review.  Hudson's claim has already been subjected to 
(..continued) 
rights of repudiation under this subsection 
within a reasonable period following . . . 
appointment. 
 
12 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2). 
  
administrative review and the district court had jurisdiction 
over it.  Nevertheless, Hudson argues that § 1821(d) is generally 
inappropriate for breach of contract actions, relying on the 
reasoning of Heno I.  Insofar as the rationale of Heno I depended 
on the agency's refusal to review Heno's claim, Hudson's argument 
must fail as no such agency refusal occurred here.  If Hudson's 
argument is based on the notion that Heno I made the more general 
statement that contract claims against the receiver are not 
subject to administrative review, it is inconsistent with Heno II 
and also with our opinion in Rosa, in which we held that all 
claims for monetary relief arising out of the receiver's alleged 
breach of a contract were subject to the administrative review 
procedures of § 1821(d).  Rosa, 938 F.2d at 392-93.  Furthermore, 
we find unconvincing the other case on which Hudson relies, 
Homeland Stores, Inc. v. Resolution Trust Corp., 17 F.3d 1269, 
1275 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 317 (1994), which 
explicitly differs from Rosa on this point. 
 C. 
 Finally, Hudson contends the application of the time 
constraints imposed by 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A), combined with 
the time bar contained in § 1821(d)(3)(B) (which sets the cut-off 
date for claims submitted to administrative review), could in 
some cases raise significant constitutional problems of improper 
delegation of authority, denial of due process, and taking under 
the Fifth Amendment.  Hudson maintains this could result where 
the receiver causes injury to a party, giving rise to a cause of 
action after the date has passed by which creditors were to bring 
  
their claims under 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B).19  The receiver, 
which has discretion to hear some late claims under 12 U.S.C. § 
1821(d)(5)(C), could exercise its discretion against hearing the 
claim.20  This failure to go through the administrative review 
                     
19
.  Section 1821(d)(3)(B) provides: 
 
 (3) Authority of receiver to determine claims 
 
  . . . . 
 
  (B)  Notice requirements 
  The receiver, in any case involving the 
liquidation or winding up of the affairs of a 
closed depository institution, shall-- 
   (i) promptly publish a notice 
to the depository institution's 
creditors to present their claims, 
together with proof, to the 
receiver by a date specified in the 
notice which shall be not less than 
90 days after publication of such 
notice; and 
   (ii) republish such notice 
approximately 1 month and 2 months, 
respectively after the publication 
under clause (i). 
 
Because the receiver must publish notice "promptly," the bar date 
will fall approximately 6 months after it is appointed.  Claims 
filed after the bar date are disallowed, with certain exceptions, 
under § 1821(d)(5)(C).  
20
.  The text of § 1821(d)(5)(C) appears supra note 7.  In fact, 
the discretion of the receiver to hear late claims is limited, 
and would not apply to many of the post-closing claims against 
the receiver that Hudson describes.  Claims that are filed late 
where the claimant had timely notice of the appointment of the 
receiver but the claim did not arise before the end of the cut-
off date would not qualify as exceptions under 
§ 1821(d)(5)(C)(ii).  That was the case in Heno v. FDIC, 20 F.3d 
1204, 1207-08 (1st Cir. 1994), in which the complainant 
concededly had actual notice of the FDIC's appointment but held 
no claim to assert until after the cut-off date. 
  
procedure would in turn create a bar to judicial review under § 
1821(d)(13)(D).21  Rosa v. Resolution Trust Corp., 938 F.2d 383, 
391-92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 582 (1991).  A 
plaintiff whose claim the receiver had declined to review as 
untimely would therefore be left with no remedy for the alleged 
wrong.  
 We recently recognized that due process might be 
violated where a party that had no reasonable opportunity to 
submit a claim for administrative review had its claim barred 
from judicial review.  National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. City Sav., 
F.S.B., 28 F.3d 376, 389-90 n.16 (3d Cir. 1994).  Hudson argues 
that to prevent the possibility of this unconstitutional result 
each claim arising from the acts or omissions of the receiver 
must proceed not under 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (d)(6)(A), but instead 
under § 1821(d)(5)(C), which treats disallowance of claims filed 
after the end of the filing period.  The time constraint in § 
1821(d)(6)(A) for filing for administrative review of claims 
against the receiver would then not apply to the claims, nor 
would the venue provision.  Hudson would also have us read the 
permissive language of § 1821(d)(5)(C)22 as mandatory.  See FDIC 
v. diStefano, 839 F. Supp. 110, 118 (D.R.I. 1993) (reading the 
"may" in § 1821(d)(5)(C) as "must"); Scott v. Resolution Trust 
Corp. (In re Scott), 157 B.R. 297, 318 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1993) 
                     
21
.  For the text of this subparagraph, see supra note 9. 
22
.  That language is "and such claim may be considered by the 
receiver."  12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(C). 
  
(same), withdrawn, 162 B.R. 1004 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994).  This, 
Hudson states, would relieve the due process concerns raised by 
the FDIC having discretion not to hear certain claims, which, if 
exercised, could operate to bar jurisdiction in the courts.   
 Hudson reads the due process requirements too broadly.  
We did not suggest in National Union or elsewhere that due 
process mandates two separate claims procedures.  Rather, we 
stated that where the jurisdictional bar contained in § 
1821(d)(13)(D) could not constitutionally be applied, a court 
would have jurisdiction over the claim.  National Union, 28 F.3d 
at 389-90 n.16, 393 n.22.  Where the statute does not otherwise 
direct or suggest the recognition of two separate claims 
procedures, we decline to apply the jurisdictional bar where it 
would yield an unconstitutional result.  A single claims 
procedure is more consistent with our decision in Rosa, which 
held that claims against the receiver, as well as claims against 
the failed institution, were subject to the "statutory exhaustion 
requirement" of administrative review before the courts had 
jurisdiction over them.  938 F.2d at 392-93.  Thus, it would 
appear there is no constitutional infirmity.  But we need not 
decide that here.  The possibility of a jurisdictional bar does 
not arise under the facts of this case because the administrative 
review process was completed.    
 
 III. 
 For the reasons set forth, the judgment of the district 
court will be affirmed. 
